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- ART. I. — 1. *Speech of the Hon. L. Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi.* Congressional Record, August, 1876.
2. *Speech of the Hon. J. A. Garfield of Ohio.* Congressional Record, August, 1876.

THE Southern Question, as it is somewhat vaguely called, — for it is much larger than a mere sectional question, — has been the shame and perplexity of our politics for the last ten years. Difficult enough in itself, it has become so entangled with party purposes, that its discussion is a snare to the feet of honest men; and yet it must be discussed. Its solution is imperatively demanded in the interest of the whole country, for as it stands to-day it is becoming an absolute danger to all healthy habit of political thought and all proper and constitutional method of administration.

It is therefore with pleasure that we find the dreary waste of the Congressional Record abruptly broken by two speeches of more than ordinary elevation. The effort of these speeches was to raise the discussion of the Southern question above the plane of mere partisan argument, and it has been successful. Of course a certain party character must attach to Congressional speeches on the eve of a Presidential election, but in this case not more than sufficient to relieve and illustrate the discussion. The speakers were both men of recognized ability, genuine representatives of widely variant constituencies, and exceptionably thorough exponents of the conflicting interests

and sentiments which provoked the debate. The issue was made clearly, strongly, and fairly, and the contention was sustained with earnestness and eloquence. We propose to review these speeches, to appreciate justly the character of the question raised, and the methods of solution advocated on the one side and the other. It will, however, be necessary to say a few words in explanation of the point at which we propose to take up the argument of Messrs. Lamar and Garfield.

That the issue which was made by the late civil war had to be met sooner or later in the life of the United States, no one familiar with their history can doubt. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were only landmarks on a road, the direction of which we all know, but the terminus of which is as much beyond our ken as it was beyond the vision of the men who framed them. That a government completely and admirably suited to thirteen sparsely settled and just emancipated colonies, with no prescience of the future and a good many lingering prejudices of the past, would or could exist without great modifications, was simply impossible. You might as well expect the great Cumberland road and the old mail-coach to do the work of our railroads and telegraphs. And this is just what the Federalists, a party certainly led by statesmen of larger ability than this country has ever since possessed, understood thoroughly. They intended the Constitution to be expansive. They expected by Presidential influence and judicial legislation to extend and consolidate the power of the government. But there were three difficulties in their way which no political ability could overcome. First, the country had no centre of social influence corresponding to the political influence of the government, and history proves that no great civil change can be effected without such a combination. Second, the comparative weakness of the Federal government, consequent upon this condition of things, and the powerful traditions of colonial consequence, gave time and opportunity for the development of strong State feeling; while the dependence of the senatorial elections upon the State legislatures gave a pre-eminence to the interests of State politics fatal to any such consolidation. And, lastly, the influence of the French Revolution colored the

sentiment and excited the sympathies of the people so strongly as to give an irresistible democratic bias both to our local and national politics. The Federal party, therefore, although it had Washington's sympathy, Hamilton's brain, and the strong will of the elder Adams, failed utterly, — so completely, indeed, that even to this day no one has ventured to do it historical justice.

Mr. Jefferson's election having worked a complete revolution, the State-rights theory became the authorized and authoritative construction of the Constitution ; and from his term down to General Jackson's election it manifested its vigor and its virtue. There was no undue development of contending sectional interests, the power of the Federal government was not huge enough to overshadow State pride or too greatly to diminish State power, and the personal tone and temper of our leading statesmen still fairly represented the traditions of culture, wealth, and character which attached to the great personages of our early history. But the close of General Jackson's administration clearly showed what had become of the theory of State rights. Almost all the questions which made the politics of his day divided all the States alike, — the United States Bank, internal improvements, the tariff, the currency. On all these questions there was an administration as well as an opposition party in every Southern as well as in every Northern State. Even in South Carolina, Mr. Calhoun's own State, there was a large and powerful Union party in opposition to the nullification movement. But this could not conceal the fact that the principle of Jackson's administration was the rule of the numerical majority of the people of the whole country, — a principle not inconsistent in practice with State rights so long as the States were politically divided in themselves, but utterly opposed both to the practice and to the theory of State rights whenever it should happen that the States themselves became the parties of a minority and a majority. So true was this, that Mr. Calhoun, the chiefest of its champions, who had taken up the theory where Jefferson left it, who perfected and adapted it to the wants of his section, but who found it break to pieces in his hands as a weapon of defence, was driven to the further step of minority representa-

tion, and bequeathed, as the dying legacy of his long, practical experience, the doctrine that the only safety of the South was a dual executive, — the abstract idea which in its concrete form was surrendered forever with General Lee's sword at Appomattox.

For while the extreme democratic doctrine of the absolute right of the numerical majority had become the principle of the government, the majority and minority had been concentrating within sectional lines, and assuming to each other a position of implacable hostility. When, therefore, in his last diplomatic circular to the foreign ministers of the United States, Mr. Buchanan said, "You are of course aware that the election of last November (1860) resulted in the choice of Mr. Abraham Lincoln; that he was the candidate of the Republican or Antislavery party; that the preceding discussion had been confined almost entirely to topics connected directly or indirectly with the subject of negro slavery; that every Northern State cast its whole electoral vote (except three in New Jersey) for Mr. Lincoln, while in the whole South the popular sentiment against him was absolutely universal," it was evident that the time had come for a new departure in American politics. Whether that departure could have been in a peaceable direction, it would be very idle now to inquire. The war came. The war ended in the complete and irremediable defeat of one of the parties to the conflict. Whether or not slavery was indirectly but absolutely the real issue in the controversy, it is clear that at its inception the question was as to the constitutional relation of the States to the Federal government. But in its progress the North did what every people at war have done, and will ever do. They struck where they could strike hardest. They abolished slavery, and any discussion now of the motive or technical legality of this action is simply absurd. The fact is undisputed and undisputable, and it is with its consequences alone that statesmen have to deal.

Upon the surrender of General Lee, then, there were two questions at once presented to the statesmanship of the country, the one very much complicating the other. The first was, What is the relation of the seceding States to the Union as interpreted by the war? the second, What is the relation

of the newly emancipated slave to the society in which he found himself free? both to be solved, not in the interest of the North or the South, of the master or the slave, but in the interest of that nation the existence and reality of which the war had assured; and both questions needing immediate solution to enable the country to resume and develop its natural and healthy life. No language can exaggerate the importance of these questions to us and their consequence to the future, not only of this country but of civilization.

Let us begin by admitting frankly and stating fairly the great difficulties of the questions with which the Republican party had to deal in 1865. For it must be remembered that at the time of the surrender the Republican party was in broad general sentiment and policy the United States. That section of the Democratic party — if it had extent and coherence enough to be called a party — which was opposed to the war could scarcely venture to hold, much less to express, an opinion, and the South was simply a vanquished territory. The North looked upon the war of secession as a wicked and unnatural rebellion; the national feeling which lay, as it were, latent in its people, had been excited into heated and patriotic enthusiasm by the varying fortunes of the struggle; in almost every household were the memory of bitter sacrifice and the pride of overwhelming success; and now, after long years of wearying hope and fear, after the lavish expenditure of untold wealth and uncounted lives, the great triumph was won. The Union had been preserved; and what more natural than that first resolution, that it should never be so perilled again? But how? Who had been conquered and what was to be punished? The extreme theory which even Mr. Stevens never ventured to develop to its full logical consequence would have met one side of the difficulty. The leaders of the rebellion would have been decimated, the estates of Southern landowners confiscated, and the subjugated white man and the emancipated negro would have been governed by one great imperial despotism. But where was the despotism? It had to be created. Certainly such was not the United States, even excluding the Southern States which had seceded. The Union which had been thus preserved was a Union of States; and the United

States as they were after their victory, with the Constitution as it was even after it was widened and strengthened by war interpretation, could not have endured with such a burden as a subject South. The whole machinery of government would have given way under the pressure. Besides which, the American mind could not as yet conceive the idea of the Union without the States. The States had attempted to break up the Union and had failed. The Union had not attempted to destroy the States, and there they were, their arms surrendered, their armies disbanded, and no further hindrance to the execution everywhere of the laws of the United States. But, on the other hand, if these impalpable but indestructible States were back again in the Union with all their rights unimpaired, simply because they were beaten, where was the security for the future? Who made these States? The very men who had defied the Union and striven to destroy it at Manassas, at Fredericksburg, at the Wilderness. If these States were to be represented, who was to represent them? Was Mr. Davis to come back from Mississippi, Mr. Mason from Virginia, Mr. Slidell from Louisiana? Was the Confederate Congress only to adjourn from Richmond to the opposition seats in the Capitol at Washington? Such, indeed, might be the logic of the Constitution; but was such a thing natural or possible? Would the North, would any people who had gone through such a war, permit such a conclusion? Fairly considering the obstacles and the temper of public opinion at the North, every reasonable Southern man must admit the immense and intrinsic difficulties of the position.

On the other hand, what was the condition of the South? From the outset of its colonial settlement the civilization of the South was forced by the social and political elements that composed it to take a development, not only different from, but in some respects antagonistic to, the popular spirit and habit of the North. Slavery, which soon after the formation of the Union became the controlling influence of its fortune and creed, necessarily created a land and slaveholding oligarchy, whose interests and opinions shaped Southern policy and Southern sentiment; while the North was increasing its free population by an almost incredible rate of immigration, was building great

cities, straining every nerve to extend and perfect its means of internal communication, diffusing popular education, and thus becoming a powerful and active democracy. The political alliance between slavery and the Democratic party at the North to some extent and for some time concealed and delayed this antagonism. But the alliance was unnatural. Its consequence was to undemocratize the Democratic party and secure its final defeat, while its services to the South were only temporary, and, worse than that, delusive, by the false security it engendered. As General Garfield said, if not with entire accuracy, yet with force : —

“The Democratic party has been the evil genius of the South in all these years. They yielded their own consciences to you on the slavery question, and led you to believe the North would always yield. They made you believe that we would not fight to save the Union. They made you believe that if we ever dared to cross the Potomac or the Ohio to put down your rebellion, we could only do so across the dead bodies of many hundred thousands of Northern Democrats. . . . And later, when you would have accepted the Constitutional amendment and restoration without universal suffrage, the same evil genius held you back. In 1868 it still deceived you. In 1872 it led you into

‘A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog
Between Damietta and Mount Casius old
Where armies old have sunk.’”

As the progress of the disintegration of the Northern Democracy developed itself, the South was forced to concentrate its defence upon the constitutional theory of State rights. And it so happened that just at the point in our political history where the natural divergence of the two sections was becoming evident to even careless observers, a statesman was born to the South, the splendor of whose intellect, the purity and elevation of whose character, and the national breadth of whose fame, made him at once the idol and leader of his people. Driven by a series of events which we cannot now describe, and which, perhaps, politicians of less ability and more selfish purpose could have better controlled, Mr. Calhoun had reached that point, and had carried the South with him, where their belief and his was that their very existence was

in imminent peril, and where their only salvation lay in the exercise of the reserved rights of the States. Soon after, he died, leaving them the terrible responsibility of testing the practical value of this protection. Now, whatever may have been the truth or error of these convictions, this is certain, that at the date of secession the whole South, with no appreciable dissent, were earnestly persuaded that the contest was for their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor, and that they had, under a proper interpretation of the fundamental law of their political existence, the right to protect themselves by withdrawing from the Union. They applied the test. Their defence crumbled like the walls of a shattered fortress, and their flag of defiance sank into the dust forever. No language can accurately describe their condition. The Confederate government vanished; "the earth hath bubbles as the water hath, and this was of them." In sixty days, armies which had made the world ring with their heroic achievements, were dissolved, leaving, from the borders of Virginia to the boundaries of Texas, not even the nucleus of a guerilla resistance; and the people of the South, appalled, bewildered, stunned, gathered hopeless and helpless under the ruined shelter of their State governments. No man knew whether he was the citizen of a free State or the conquered subject of a foreign power. No governor knew whether he could execute a law, no judge whether he could pass a sentence. The industry of the country was paralyzed. Four millions of slaves were suddenly freed, and no one knew how far he was privileged to order, no one knew how far he was bound to obey. The whole currency, upon the circulation of which depended the daily life of millions of people, became in a few hours as worthless as dead leaves. For a moment there existed what has never before existed in civilized history, an utter dissolution of government, and society was held together only by common instincts and common necessities.

As if further to complicate and aggravate all that was perplexing and mischievous, Mr. Lincoln, of whom the South knew little, but of whom they did know that he was the representative man, in fact and in place, of the victors, was assassinated within a few days of General Lee's surrender, and Andrew Johnson undertook the solution of these problems.

The peculiarity of Mr. Johnson's position did not diminish his embarrassments. A Vice-President succeeding a President for the unexpired term of office has always in our history occupied a position of traditional trouble. He is not in sympathy with the opposition, and yet he is an interference with the party policy of which the President was the representative. All the personal interests of the old administration have been altered and confused by the change ; and the larger the independence and integrity of the new Executive, the more impossible he finds it not to assert his individuality. Mr. Johnson's position was exceptionally difficult. He was a Southern man by birth, and a Democrat by profession. He was both of the things that at the moment were most odious to the Northern people. Nor did Mr. Johnson, in compensation for this weakness, possess the strength which would have come from the full confidence of the South. He was exceedingly unpopular at the South. He had represented for years, and prided himself on representing, the democratic element of Southern society. The great slaveholding oligarchy which governed the South was not his friend, nor he theirs ; and the scorn and dislike with which the leaders of Southern opinion regarded him had more than once found bitter expression on the floor of the Senate. He could not act as a mediator between the victors and the vanquished. He could not speak for the North and say, This must be done. He could not speak for the South and say, This will be done.

The South ought not to forget, it will always gratefully remember, that Mr. Johnson's course, by the delay which it caused, afforded time for popular passion to cool, and for the intrinsic difficulties of the question to force themselves upon the consideration of thinking men ; and that in all probability it saved the South from that severity of punishment which threatened its leaders, if not its people. But how utter was the failure of his plan of reconstruction the South knows only too well. We do not propose now to discuss it. All with which we are now concerned is, that after his defeat the Republican party set aside the Executive as a component part of the government, and proceeded to the administration of national affairs very much after the fashion of a committee of safety of

a French convention. Of their action it is only necessary to say here, that they framed and put into operation that system of reconstruction under which the governments of the Southern States have been created, and for the last seven years have been maintained ; for at this point we propose to take up the argument of Mr. Lamar and General Garfield. Now we wish to state with all possible precision and clearness what we understand to be the issue of this controversy. As far as it is a mere political discussion as to the merits of Democrats and Republicans, clever and effective though it be, we are not interested in it. What the country wants is, that this Southern question be eliminated as a disturbing element from our national politics. The thinking men and the business men do not much care which party settles it, so that it is settled ; what they wish is that whether the next administration is controlled by Mr. Tilden or directed by Mr. Hayes, the policy of this country shall be allowed to run its natural course, free from the disturbing influence of this bitter discord.

The issue, as we understand it, involves no change in the reconstruction acts. What is past is past. The State governments created by that policy have become the regular machinery of government ; universal suffrage has been adopted. Nor is it necessary to appreciate the motives which induced that policy. It may have been the unavoidable result of the intrinsic difficulties of the situation, it may have been the reckless work of political passion ; that makes no difference now. The undisputed fact is, that seven years of this rule have produced a condition of things which, making all allowance for exaggeration and misrepresentation on either side, is a disgrace and a danger to the country. Is there a remedy, and, if so, what is it ? This is the question Mr. Lamar attempts to answer. In his answer he takes four positions as premises.

1. That the present condition of the South is the unfortunate but natural result of a sudden and unparalleled social and political revolution, which would have confused by its shock the peace and order of any society in the civilized world. In his own language, which for compact force and point cannot be improved, —

“ To illustrate the disturbing force of this measure, let us suppose that in the six New England States and the States of New York and

New Jersey, whose population corresponds most nearly to that of our Southern States, in one night four million of unaccustomed, incongruous population, such as Mexicans and Chinese, should be incorporated into the political system of those Commonwealths, and by some paramount power outside of those States should be so compacted together as to gain control of all the departments of their government, of all the offices, all the institutions, State and municipal, — in a word, invested with the entire sovereignty of their body politic, I ask you would not the repose of society be disturbed ; would not all assurance of law, of healthful industry, of business arrangements and investments, — would not all confidence give way to dismay and perplexity, to restless fears, wild passions, and bloody scenes? Why, sir, the more splendid their political civilization, the more complex their system of laws, and the more perfectly adjusted their social and economic forces, and the higher the moral tone of their society, the more hideous would be the ruin and the more refined the agony of the people subjected to such a catastrophe.

“ But the case as supposed is not as strong as the case which actually occurred in the Southern States. The four million of people who by a scratch of the pen were made citizens and crushed into our political system, the eight hundred thousand voters and office-holders and legislators and magistrates, had just emerged from the immemorial condition of slaves.”

2. That the necessary consequences of such a revolution were recognized by the leaders of the Republican party in the protest of Mr. Hoar of Massachusetts, against the admission of New Mexico as a State, and the protest of Mr. Sargent of California, against the further immigration of the Chinese on the Pacific coast, upon the express ground that the Mexican and Chinese population were, from race, characteristics, and inferior intelligence, incapable of healthy assimilation into the body of American citizens. And still more emphatically by the earnest, profound, and eloquent denunciation of African suffrage by such eminent men as Governor Morton of Indiana, and Governor Andrew of Massachusetts, which we repeat here, both in justice to Mr. Lamar's argument and to the subject.

Extracts from the Speech of Hon. O. P. Morton, at Richmond, Indiana, September 29, 1865.

“ I believe that in the case of four million slaves just freed from bondage there should be a period of probation and preparation before

they are brought to the exercise of political power. . . . What is their condition? Perhaps not one in five hundred — I might say one in a thousand — can read, and perhaps not one in five hundred is worth five dollars in property of any kind. . . . Can you conceive that a body of men, white or black, who have been in this condition, and their ancestors before them, are qualified to be immediately lifted from their present state into the full exercise of political power, not only to govern themselves and their neighbors, but to take part in the government of the United States? Can they be regarded as intelligent and independent voters? The mere state of facts furnishes the answer to the question. . . . To say that such men, — and it is no fault of theirs; it is simply a misfortune and a crime of this nation, — to say that such men, just emerged from slavery, are qualified for the exercise of political power, is to make the strongest proslavery argument I ever heard. It is to pay the highest compliment to the institution of slavery.

“The right to vote carries with it the right to hold office. You cannot say that the negro has a natural right to vote, but that he must vote only for white men for office. The right to vote carries with it the right to be voted for. When that right is conferred, you can make no discrimination, no distinction against the right to hold office; and the right to vote in a State carries with it the right to vote for President and members of Congress and for all Federal officers. The right of suffrage being conferred in South Carolina for State purposes, under our Constitution, as I have before pointed out, carries with it the right to vote for President and Vice-President and members of Congress.

“If you enfranchise all the negroes in these States you will have at least twenty negro votes to one white vote; and in the work of reconstructing the States of South Carolina, Alabama, and Florida, you will have a larger proportion, — perhaps thirty colored votes to one white. Now, I ask you, what is to be the effect of that? The first effect will be, you will have colored State governments. Under such a condition of things the negro would no more vote for a white man than you up here would vote for a black man. They would no more elect a white man than you would elect a black man. Human nature is the same, whether in a white or colored skin. There could be nothing that would confer more pleasure upon a man of that race, of course, than the elevation to political power of a man of his own race and color. Having secured power, they would retort upon us that which we have so steadily practised upon them. If you give them the vote, they will elect men of their own color, and we would

have no right to blame them. We would rather think badly of them if they did not. I would ask you if the negroes of Hayti, or any other place where they are in a majority, have ever elected a white man to office. Under Mr. Sumner's plan you will give them an overwhelming majority in every one of these States, and you will give them the political power of the South.

"That they will exercise this power by electing men of their own color is absolutely certain. Believing that human nature is the same under different complexions, that the negroes are not differently constituted from ourselves, and that they have like passions with us, we cannot doubt how this power will be exercised. Some will say that it is all right; if they can find colored men qualified, all right. There are enough colored men of education in the North to go to the South, and fill every office there, and I have no doubt they stand ready to do it. Here we deny to them almost every right except that of mere personal liberty; and it is so in Illinois and many other Northern States; and when you present to them the prospect of holding the highest offices in the gift of the people of the Southern States, rest assured they will embrace it. They will have colored governors, and colored members of Congress, and senators, and judges of the Supreme Court, etc. Very well; and suppose they do send colored senators and representatives to Congress, I have no doubt you will find men in the North who will be willing to sit beside them and will not think themselves degraded by doing so. I have nothing to say to this. I am simply discussing the political effect of it. In every State where there is a colored State government, a negro for governor, and a negro for supreme judge, white emigration will cease; there will be no more white emigration to any such State. You cannot find the most ardent antislavery man in Wayne County who will go and locate in a State that has a colored State government. You will absolutely shut off at once and effectually all emigration from the Northern States, and from Europe, too, whenever that event shall happen. Thus they will remain permanently colored States in the South. The white men who are now there would remove from them; they would not remain under such dominion.

"Very well, say some; that is all very well, if we can get the negroes to go there. But let me say that the colored States would be a balance of power in this country. I ask, Is it desirable to have a colored State government? I say it is not; it is not, for many reasons. One reason is that such States would perpetually constitute a balance of power. They would be held bound by that most stringent tie that ever held men together, — the tie of color and race, the tie of

a down-trodden and despised race. As three hundred thousand slaveholders by a common tie were able to govern this nation for a long time, so four million people, bound together by a much stronger tie, despised by the whole world as they have been, would constantly vote and act together; and their united vote would constitute a balance of power that might control the government of this nation.

"I submit, then, however clearly and strongly we may admit the natural right of the negro, — I submit it to the intelligence of the people that colored State governments are not desirable; that they will bring about results that are not to be hoped for; that finally they would threaten to bring about and, I believe, would result in a war of races.

"Now the question turns up, how can this be avoided? If I had the power I would arrange it in this way: I would give these men a period of probation and preparation; I would give them time to acquire a little property and get a little education; time to learn something about the simplest forms of business and prepare themselves for the exercise of political power. At the end of ten, fifteen, or twenty years, let them come into the enjoyment of their political rights. By that time these States will have been so completely filled up by emigration from the North and from Europe that the negroes will be in a permanent minority. Why? Because the negroes have no emigration, nothing but the natural increase, while we have emigration from all the world and natural increase besides. Thus, by postponing the thing only to such times as the negroes are qualified to enjoy political rights, the dangers I have been considering would have fully passed away, their influence would no longer be dangerous in the manner I have indicated, and a conflict of races would not be more likely to happen than it now is in Massachusetts. In Massachusetts the negroes have exercised political rights for twenty-five years, and yet there has been no disturbance there, no conflict of races. Why? Because the negroes have been in the minority."

Extract from Governor Andrew's Valedictory Address, 5th January, 1866.

"It may be asked, Why not demand the suffrage for colored men, in season for their vote in the business of reorganization? My answer is, I assume that the colored men are in favor of those measures which the Union needs to have adopted. But it would be idle to reorganize those States by the colored vote. If the popular vote of the white race is not to be had in favor of the guaranties justly required, then I am in favor of holding on just where we now are. I am not

in favor of a surrender of the present rights of the Union to a struggle between a white minority, aided by the freedmen on the one hand, against a majority of the white race on the other. I would not consent, having rescued those States by arms from secession and rebellion, to turn them over to anarchy and chaos.

"I only know that we ought to demand and to secure the co-operation of the strongest and ablest minds and natural leaders of opinion in the South. If we cannot gain their support of the just measures needful for the work of safe reorganization, reorganization will be delusive and full of danger.

"Why not try them? They are the most hopeful subjects to deal with, in the very nature of the case. They have the brain and the experience and the education to enable them to understand the exigencies of the present situation. They have the courage, as well as the skill, to lead the people in the direction their judgments point, in spite of their own and the popular prejudice. Weaker men, those of less experience, who have less hold on the public confidence, are comparatively powerless. Is it consistent with reason and our knowledge of human nature to believe the masses of Southern men able to face about, to turn their backs on those they have trusted and followed, and to adopt the lead of those who have no magnetic hold on their hearts or minds? Reorganization in the South demands the aid of men of great moral courage, who can renounce their own past opinions and do it boldly; who can comprehend what the work is and what are the logical consequences of the new situation; men who have interests urging them to rise to the height of the occasion. They are not the strong men, from whom weak, vacillating counsels come; nor are they the great men, from whom come counsels born of prejudices and follies, having their root in an institution they know to be dead and buried beyond the hope of resurrection."

3. That these inevitable difficulties were aggravated by the fact that the essential principle of the reconstruction policy was the creation of that very color line which is now represented as the work of Southern malignity:—

"The result of that conflict was, that the Federal government assumed, as a political necessity, the exclusive prerogative of reconstructing government in the South. The policy of reconstruction excluded the white race (on account of its suspected disloyalty) as the basis of the new order. But as the black race was considered as incompetent to manage the new structures built for them, military power, for the first time in the history of the American government,

was employed as the force to put and keep in operation the machinery of civil government. I do not propose to discuss this policy, but simply to call special attention to one feature of it. All the measures in the furtherance of that policy—the Freedman's Bureau, which cut all connection of the two races sheer asunder, whose agents and officers were made judges to try and punish offences by the whites against the rights of freedmen, without jury, or the right of judicial appeal; the act dividing the South, without reference to State lines, into military districts, and vesting the power of appointing all civil officers in a commanding general; the acts for restoring civil governments—were based upon this one idea of protecting the enfranchised black race against the wrongs anticipated from the disfranchised white race; and, as a matter of fact, therefore, this reconstruction legislation, as conceived and enforced, actually arrayed the two races into distinct and opposing classes, and drew the color line as distinctly and perfectly as if such race distinction had been enjoined in the Constitution. The very first principle of government your new-made citizens saw in operation was the principle of race discrimination. The very first lesson in civil government which they learned was the proscription of the white race as an object of political distrust and resentment.

“The strange spectacle of these two races locally intermingled, bound together by the strongest ties of interest and affection, yet as completely separated politically as if a deep gulf had sunk between them; the passions incident to party contests in which the contestants differ not in conviction, but in race, and now charged as one of the heavy items against the South, find their authorship and origin in the legislation of the government and the action of its agents. One moment's consideration will convince any fair mind of this. The measures devised for the sole benefit, protection, and ascendancy of one race will surely command the support of that race; and if the same policy disfranchises the other race, hurls it from its proud tradition into a condition rife with all the elements of humiliation, and deprives it even of its ancient guaranties against the oppression of arbitrary power, the inevitable effect is perforce to drive that race into opposition to those measures. Thus, I repeat, by a policy which drew one race to its support and drove the other into opposition, the separation of the two was produced without the voluntary agency of either, and against the natural tendencies of both.”

4. That the investigating committees of Congress sent to

the South for the express purpose of justifying these Southern State governments are obliged to acknowledge a condition of political life which nobody is willing to defend, which everybody wishes to terminate, but which party exigencies compel the Federal administration to support and sustain : —

“Sir, take the features of that statement. What are they? Oppressive governments, burdens of taxation, and prostrate people. What greater woe can there be than this? What more accursed fate can befall a people than such a government as Mr. Hoar describes, illegal in its every department, marked by maladministration, and reeking with dishonesty and corruption; or, as Mr. Forster describes it, an infamous despotism, consuming all the resources of a people? Where, I repeat, on earth or in what age of the world, have you not had violence and turbulence where a people are prostrated by the burdens of oppressive government, and tortured and impoverished by taxation? Where have you ever seen orderly, quiet, and peaceable citizens whose governors are lawless felons, whose ministerial officers are forgers and thieves, and their magistrates scoundrels?

“And, sir, when this prostrate people, writhing in their agony, turn over and jostle these rickety establishments that would fall down of their own rot if let alone, when, as is almost inevitable, disorders occur, the national authority is called upon, the Federal Executive is invoked, — for what? To protect the prostrate people against these illegal, dishonest, corrupt, and oppressive governments? No; but to protect and maintain these governments, and to hold the people down in quiet submission to them! What a policy! This great Federal government powerless for the protection of the people against oppressions of local government, but omnipotent to maintain those governments and enforce their oppressions.”

The conclusion which Mr. Lamar draws from these premises is this: If the reconstruction policy, supplemented and supported by the steady interference of the Federal government, has produced this condition, — if it is, as he admits, impossible to reverse that policy, destroy the State governments which it created and abolish negro suffrage, — then there is but one course to adopt consistent with the spirit and form of the Constitution, and that is, to leave the Southern States to settle this problem for themselves. The two questions which, as we said, were submitted to the country upon General Lee's surrender

have been answered. The States have been restored to the Union as equals ; the negro has been made a free citizen. Let the solution stand. Allow Louisiana and Mississippi and Carolina to do precisely what Massachusetts and Indiana and Ohio can do, and give to the free negro citizen precisely the same power and protection that is given to the free white citizen, no more and no less. Mr. Lamar does not pretend to deny or attempt to conceal that there are grave difficulties in the way of this solution ; that it will produce much local discontent ; that its reactionary tendency may, for the moment, be to go too far ; that it will excite bitter opposition and passionate outcry from the corrupt and dishonest politicians who have, at the South, crawled into power and grown plethoric and venomous with plunder ; that the negro, although in a physical majority, will be reduced to a position of inferior influence until, with time and civil training, he has learned how to accumulate wealth by honest industry, to educate himself for the responsibility of citizenship, and thus to exercise a natural and wholesome influence upon public opinion. But he contends that the natural relation of the races, their identification in interest, the labor necessities of a community almost entirely agricultural, and the conservative temper of white wealth, character, and intellect, will solve these difficulties more promptly, more safely, and more justly than the perpetual and unconstitutional interference of the Federal government, which, wrong in itself, threatens by this subtle and illegitimate usurpation to unsettle all true principles of constitutional government, and to destroy the liberties of the whole commonwealth.

To the argument thus stated, we do not think Mr. Garfield's speech a sufficient reply. It is an elevated and able speech. Nothing can be higher or worthier than the following expression of its spirit : —

“ It will not do, Mr. Chairman, to speak of the gigantic revolution through which we have lately passed as a thing to be adjusted and settled by a change of administration. It was cyclical, epochal, century-wide, and to be studied in its broad and grand perspective, — a revolution of even wider scope, so far as time is concerned, than the Revolution of 1776. We have been dealing with elements and

forces which have been at work on this continent more than two hundred and fifty years. I trust I shall be excused if I take a few moments to trace some of the leading phases of the great struggle. And in doing so, I beg gentlemen to see that the subject itself lifts us into a region where the individual sinks out of sight and is absorbed in the mighty current of great events. It is not the occasion to award praise or pronounce condemnation. In such a revolution men are like insects, that fret and toss in the storm, but are swept onward by the resistless movements of elements beyond their control. I speak of this revolution not to praise the men who aided it, or to censure the men who resisted it, but as a force to be studied, as a mandate to be obeyed."

Some of Mr. Lamar's points are met with an ingenuity and force fully equal to his own, and the reply to that portion of Mr. Lamar's speech which has a party bias is very telling. But General Garfield does not deny a single one of the four premises which we have just stated. He does not deny that war and emancipation had unsettled the very foundations of Southern society. He does not deny that the leaders of the Republican party declared in 1865 that negro suffrage was an unwise and dangerous policy. He does not deny that the reconstruction policy drew the color line with fatal precision. He does not deny the corrupt and debased character of the Southern State governments. When he contents himself with a vigorous arraignment of the general fitness of the Democratic party for the government of the country, he leaves entirely unanswered the main point of Mr. Lamar's argument. To meet that he was bound to have gone further. Whether the Democratic or the Republican party is to govern the country is a question which interests the South only so far as either party is able or willing to settle the Southern question wisely. Never was a truer word spoken than when Mr. Lamar said, —

"Even if the events of the war and the sufferings since the war had not, as they have done, crushed out all their party attachments, nearly one half the people of the South have no attachment to the Democratic party, and in acting with it for the time being they only obey, as I said before, the imperious law of self-preservation.

"The motive which prompts their co-operation is not the expectation of filling cabinets and directing policies, but simply to get an administration which will not be unfriendly to them, an administra-

tion which in place of the appliances of force, subjugation, and domination, will give them amnesty, restoration to the privileges of American citizenship; which will accord to their States the same equal rights with other States in this Union; equality of consideration; equality of authority and jurisdiction over their own affairs; equality, sir, in exemption from the domination of their elections by the bayonet and by soldiers as the irresistible instruments of a revolting local despotism."

General Garfield then in his reply—to make it a reply in the proper sense—was bound to show either, first, that Mr. Lamar's remedy of leaving this question entirely to the Southern States for settlement was not the proper remedy; or, secondly, that if it was, the Republican party was as well disposed to adopt it as the Democratic party. Neither of these propositions does General Garfield discuss. Putting them aside, he simply sustained this thesis, that from its general character and history the Democratic party could not be safely trusted with the government of the country, and as a natural consequence that the Republican party must be continued in power. General Garfield cannot then complain if we insist that his reticence on this critical point of the discussion warrants us in assuming that he maintains the ascendancy of the Republican party, whatever may be its policy as to the Southern question, and forces us to supplement his speech by whatever authoritative exposition of that policy we can find. Unfortunately, we have not far to look. Within a day or two after General Garfield's speech, the report of the Senate committee upon the late Mississippi elections was given to the public. This report meets Mr. Lamar's argument squarely and supplies the wanting conclusion to General Garfield's speech. It is summed up in three resolutions:—

"The power of the national government will be invoked, and honor and duty will alike require its exercise. The nation cannot witness with indifference the dominion of lawlessness and anarchy in a State, with their incident evils and a knowledge of the inevitable consequences. It owes a duty to the citizens of the United States residing in Mississippi, and this duty it must perform. It has guaranteed to the State of Mississippi a republican form of government, and this guaranty must be made good.

"The measures necessary and possible in an exigency are three : —

"1. Laws may be passed by Congress for the protection of the rights of citizens in the respective States.

"2. States in anarchy, or wherein the affairs are controlled by bodies of armed men, should be denied representation in Congress.

"3. The constitutional guaranty of a republican form of government to every State will require the United States, if these disorders increase or even continue and all minor measures shall prove ineffectual, to remand the State to a territorial condition, and through a system of public education and kindred means of improvement change the ideas of the inhabitants and reconstruct the government upon a republican basis."

If these two views may be taken, as we think they fairly must be, as indicative of the two policies which the parties now contending for power propose to adopt, then a graver and a more dangerous issue was never presented to the American people.

We regret exceedingly that the adoption of these contrary policies by the great parties of the country gives to their discussion a necessarily party character. We wish to examine their value independent of that party connection, and we are willing to admit equal honesty of purpose and sincerity of conviction on the part of partisans of either. But still the essential principles of the two theories stand in such vivid contrast that it is almost impossible to discuss the principles without an implied approval or condemnation of the parties who adopt them. We will, however, endeavor to consider them simply as proposed solutions of a grave and pressing political question. We will consider the solution of the Mississippi report first, because it is the solution proposed by the party in power, and, to a certain extent, the continuity of an established policy.

The solution of the Mississippi report is to begin with an undisguised admission of the complete failure of the very policy which it professes to sustain. It is a recognition of a fact which cannot be ignored in the settlement of this question, — the fact that these Southern State governments, based upon a physical majority of negro votes, with every department in the hands of their representatives, supported by the patronage of the Federal government and when necessary by its armed intervention, have failed, notoriously and ignominiously failed, to

establish peace, restore order, or maintain a safe and equable administration of public affairs in that section. That these governments have been overturned or thwarted in their purposes by "intimidation and bribery" does not help the case. It simply proves that there is an element in these States excluded from its natural and normal influence, which, deprived of the power of legitimate expression, manifests itself in violence or corruption, as the history of the world proves it always will do. The essence of representative government is that it does represent and give scope to the influence of every element in society which is strong enough to be entitled to hearing. And when, as in this case, the property, character, and intelligence of a country are suppressed as far as legal representation is concerned, they will be felt illegally, producing dangerous perturbation in the regular movement of society. We are not defending this "intimidation and bribery." The regular government ought to put it down. But if the regular, the technical lawful government cannot put it down, what then? Surely in this stage of the world's history, in this country, the first thought suggested to a calm observer will be, that there must be something radically wrong in the constitution of such weak and incompetent governments. But the remedy proposed, in its milder features of new protective laws and the forfeiture of representation, only aggravates this weakness and incompetency, while its harsher provision cuts up at the root the whole theory of reconstruction by declaring that the States are not free and equal and the enfranchised negro not qualified for citizenship. We will not pretend to argue the constitutionality of this scheme. We will wait for such a discussion until an ingenuity equal to the audacity which proposed it shall undertake the demonstration. We confess we regard with sorrow and alarm the condition of political thought and temper which in this great commonwealth can even allow such a proposition to be made without instant and indignant rebuke. But if the centralizing tendency of war interpretation has so perverted the public mind that it can be reconciled by any sophistry to such constitutional misconstruction, is it not evident to the most partisan intelligence that it is a positive encouragement to the very violence it pretends to punish? What the South

complains of is the rule of a negro majority; what it resists with "intimidation and bribery" is the domination of that element at the polls: and this scheme says, Persevere in your violence, continue your bribery, and we will rid you of negro suffrage. We may have to remand you to a territorial form of government. But what then? You possess four fifths of the property, you control all the commerce, you own all the railroads, yours is the natural intelligence and culture. Without negro representation you need not fear your influence at Washington and over the governors sent you; and when, after a while, you come back, it will be in that condition so desired by Senator Morton, where "the negro will be in a permanent minority."

And what will be the condition of these United States when this method of political administration is incorporated into their Constitution; when it is understood that if a State differs with the dominant party in its policy, and the free exercise of its elective franchise threatens to defeat party victory, on the eve of a Presidential election the party in power can, upon the *ex parte* report of an investigating committee, remand it to a territorial condition, until by proper tuition and "kindred modes of improvement" a change has been made in the ideas of the inhabitants? What will be the power and patronage of the President when Louisiana and Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, Carolina and Florida, are mere dependencies on his will, the pro-consulates to be given with a lavish hand as the rewards of party service? Little could that pure and ardent advocate of "civil liberty" and "representative government," John Stuart Mill, have anticipated that the Republic whose fortunes he followed with such unflinching interest during the late civil troubles would point with such terrible emphasis the wisdom of the following opinions:—

"To govern a country under responsibility to the people of that country, and to govern one country under responsibility to the people of another country, are two different things. What makes the excellence of the first is that freedom is preferable to despotism, but the last is despotism."

"The government of a people by itself has a meaning and a reality; but such a thing as the government of one people by another does not and cannot exist. One people may keep another as a warren or pre-

serve for its own use, a place to make money in, a human cattle farm to be worked for the profit of its own inhabitants. But if the good of the governed is the proper business of a government, it is utterly impossible that a people should directly attend to it. The utmost they can do is to give some of their best men a commission to look after it, to whom the opinion of their own country can neither be much of a guide in the performance of their duty, nor a competent judge of the mode in which it has been performed.

"Now if there be a fact to which all experience certifies, it is that when a country holds another in subjection, the individuals of the ruling people who resort to the foreign country to make their fortunes are, of all others, those who most need to be held under powerful restraint. They are always one of the chiefest difficulties of the government. Armed with the *prestige* and filled with the scornful overbearingness of the conquering nation, they have the feelings inspired by absolute power without its sense of responsibility." — MILL'S *Representative Government*.

Mortifying as is the hope, we cannot but hope that this scheme has not even the sincerity of fanaticism ; that proposed just at the close of the session, when any practical legislation is impossible, it is only another miserable illustration of that system of party tactics which disfigures our public character, degrades those who devise, demoralizes those who execute, and renders almost impossible any well-founded confidence in representative government. But foolish and wicked as it is, there it stands as the solution of the Southern question, proposed, we will not say, by the Republican party, but certainly by those who, like Mr. Boutwell, claim and aspire to lead it.

We now turn to the other solution. It certainly possesses the advantage of being simple, constitutional, and representing the unanimous conviction of that portion of the South of which Mr. Lamar is the representative man. Will it be effective ; will it do what Mr. Lamar predicts ; will it restore peace and order ; will it administer equal justice to all men ; will it restore confidence to industry and capital ; will it give just and wholesome influence to property, intelligence, and character, and at the same time preserve in spirit and truth to the recently enfranchised race those rights and privileges which have been secured to them by the Constitution, and which are in themselves guaranties and opportunity for

that slow but steady improvement which the interests both of the race and country require?

The difficulty in such a discussion is that men approach it not only with strong, preconceived theories, and excited by party passion, but that the fairest and honestest representatives of either race state the same facts so as to give them the most contrary significance. But we think there are some facts which afford the means of at least moving in a direction which will lead to a safe and steady judgment. For it must be borne in mind that no solution of this question can be an immediate one. Broken institutions, like broken limbs, require time and rest to knit; and restless impatience, however natural under suffering, only delays and hinders the final cure. An act of Congress may make four millions of slaves freemen in the twinkling of an eye; but it cannot make them intelligent, responsible, conscientious citizens, "to take effect from the passage of this bill."

Now we think the South has the right to insist that its history of the last ten years proves that Southern discontent and disorder, whatever be their degree, are not threats against the Union nor defiance of the Constitution. For it seems to be indisputable that during the three years of the development of the reconstruction policy, although it worked the completest social revolution known to history, although there was not a feature that was not harsh and repulsive, although the newly reorganized State governments were put aside, and the States remanded to the condition of conquered territories, yet while the United States authority governed the South, in all that time there was not a single act of resistance to that authority. The people of the South recognized the power of the Union. When it ordered, they obeyed. They devoted themselves assiduously and hopefully to their private affairs, and strove quietly, and not without fair success, to renew the relation between capital and labor which emancipation had placed upon such altered foundations, and upon the restoration of which the prosperity of all classes of citizens depended. It can then be justly claimed that this case, to borrow a phrase familiar to lawyers, does not involve a federal question, and that if this continuous and chronic disturbance is the result solely of local

misgovernment, then South Carolina and Mississippi have the same right which would be allowed Massachusetts or Minnesota to exercise jurisdiction.

Thus stated, the question is this: Are the Southern troubles the consequence of local misgovernment, and would the white element at the South, if left to its natural influence and power, correct and remedy that misgovernment effectually and justly? To examine these questions properly would require a very careful, patient, and unimpassioned analysis of Southern life and character. This article has already extended to such length that we can only indicate our opinions, postponing to another opportunity the detailed proof in their support.

In the period between the emancipation and the enfranchisement, we think we can say with truth that the relation between the white man and the negro had not become im-bittered. Here and there occurred cases in which the master could not forget his old authority, and the slave made insolent and offensive use of his new freedom. But these were rare, resulting almost always rather from peculiarities of individual temperament than from any fixed principle of conduct. As a general rule the condition of feeling was this. The white man felt that all that was left him was his land; that climate and soil made negro labor necessary; that the docile character of such labor, its comparative cheapness, its long special training, the still existing community of feeling bred by old association, which no one not Southern born will ever truly appreciate,—that all these made the peaceable and kindly establishment of the new relations his interest as well as his duty. More than this, the conduct of the slaves during the war, when in many sections of the South there were not white men enough at home to form a respectable patrol, and when the comfort and safety of women and children were so entirely dependent upon their conduct, had made a deep and grateful impression upon the minds of the Southern people. Every one familiar with the planting sentiment of the South knows how popular at this time, especially among the younger and more energetic men, was the theory that free labor was better than slave, and how readily lands were heavily mortgaged to enable the owners to commence the experiment.

On the other hand, the negro was shy and cautious in his new condition of life. The removal of personal restraint, the exemption from corporal punishment, the right to use his own time, to make and receive his own money, were the privileges in which he exulted. The ownership of the land by his former master still impressed him with that respect for land-ownership which is one of the elements of his character; the personal relations between the races had in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred been so kindly that there was no malignity to be developed; and, putting aside the political aspect of the question, there was on both sides a good-humored acquiescence in the emancipation, that is not the least remarkable fact in the marvellous history of the last ten years. The only ambition then manifested by the negro was for churches and schools; and, so fully was this recognized as natural and proper, that in many cases the planter, upon reorganizing his old estate, was willing to make the charge for both one of his obligations in the contract.

But this promising condition of feeling was changed by the establishment of negro suffrage. The political power of the South was at once placed in the hands of a majority utterly ignorant of the duties of citizenship, and to whom the very words used in political discussion were as unmeaning as Greek and Hebrew. In the mean while scattered over the South, filling the holes and crevices of society, there had drifted innumerable agents from the Freedmen's Bureau, subalterns from the military commands, retired soldiers from negro regiments, small and rapacious traders in the supplies that negro taste and negro extravagance demanded. Unknown and almost unnoticed, but under the guidance of abler and more considerable men, these people had organized "The Union League," and by it banded the negroes together into a solid phalanx. Then was the time of the famous party cry, "Forty acres and a mule." Then from church pulpits and political platforms, in secret associations and by private instruction, was the negro taught to hate and defy his former master, to deny the rights of property and intelligence, and to combine to give the lion's share of power and plunder to the few white men who controlled this perfect but pernicious machinery. When the State elec-

tions came on in 1868 there was no room for compromise, no opportunity for concession.

We do not propose at present either to describe in detail or to denounce the condition of things that followed. It is too well known of all men. Impartial men, without a touch of sympathy for the Southern cause, have seen with their own eyes, spoken with their own lips, and have told what they saw. The points we wish to indicate are :—

1. That the whole capital of the South was placed absolutely at the mercy of the labor of the South. The landowner, upon whose lands and by the expenditure of whose capital the whole labor of the country had to be subsisted, was deprived of any voice in the adjustment of taxation or the regulation of expenditure.

2. That the great mass of voters, ignorant, passionate, and misled, were controlled by men who were strangers to the interests and aliens to the sympathies of those they governed; and they were, without using slang phrases of abuse, adventurers to whom the States were simply fields for the gathering of unexpected fortunes and hitherto unattainable honors.

3. These lines of division were deepened and aggravated by party policy for party purposes; and the dominant party controlling the administration interfered with all its power and patronage upon the side of its friends and supporters.

Let us illustrate what we mean. Let us suppose a county in some Southern State with a population of fifteen thousand,—say five thousand whites and ten thousand negroes. All the land is owned by the whites. To bring that land into cultivation they have had to mortgage their estates heavily, at enormous interest. Fences have to be put up, buildings erected, mules bought, and full supplies of corn, bacon, and molasses to be provided. The ten thousand negroes have no means of support, of daily bread, except as laborers on these lands. Their wages are good, their work light. The law secures them a lien on the crop to enforce the payment of their dues. They are as free in every respect as their employer. But they are ignorant; they can neither read nor write; they were slaves only yesterday, and the idea of citizenship is simply beyond their comprehension. Now, members of the legisla-

ture and county commissioners are to be elected. The negroes, under the lead of men who, to say the least, are not identified either in interest, habit, or sympathy with the community, insist upon the representation. The property which is to bear the burden of taxation has no voice. Taxes are levied ruinously, money is appropriated lavishly, the member of the legislature sells his vote in open market for judge and senator, the county commissioner embezzles the funds of the county. Colored trial justices and magistrates are appointed who cannot write a warrant or construe a statute. Colored preachers, whose scripture and grammar are alike erratic, are made school-teachers. The sheriff summons a colored jury, who, rich in the prospect of a dollar a day for attendance, register with stupid impartiality verdicts which they do not understand. The Federal government throws the weight of its patronage on the same side, and every postmaster, every revenue officer, every deputy of its courts, must be either the tool or the manager of the colored majority. What hope have the minority? If they use the power which belongs to them as employers, it is intimidation; if they release rents or increase wages, it is bribery; and Federal courts and Federal troops are at hand to administer civil or martial law, as party interest may require. What becomes of the white man? Of the white population, a large proportion, who are engaged in mechanical pursuits, as carpenters, masons, blacksmiths, etc., etc., are straitened by the competition of free negro labor, which, be it remarked in passing, has everywhere in the Northern States, except in the case of menial employment, been a source of discord and disturbance wherever that element has been large enough to be appreciable, while the landholder is simply ruined. For it must be recollected that the cotton product of this county which made it a large consumer of luxuries imported from the North was in former times a surplus product. Capital wealth was in slaves, supplies were of home production. In the place of that capital is substituted the expenditure of wages, and in the present condition of Southern agriculture the purchase of corn, bacon, and artificial manures bears a fearful ratio to net proceeds of crops. Statistics would show that an almost incredible portion of the

profits of cotton (at present prices there are no profits) is consumed in its production. Not only then is this county suffering itself, but it is disabled from its former contribution to the commerce and wealth of the whole country.

Now can any man doubt that if the five thousand white men were allowed their natural and proper influence in its government, the county would be better governed? If they governed, would the negro be oppressed? Two considerations are conclusive on these questions.

1. The great want at the South is labor. The statistics with regard to negro labor, its efficiency, its relative increase or decrease in the last ten years, its transfer from one section of the South to another, are very interesting; but we must assume now, for the purposes of this argument, the general truth, which is universally admitted, that the South wants more labor and that there is no reasonable prospect of its being supplied by immigration. Besides which, what is wanted is negro labor. The white population, therefore, of the county will never consent to have their ten thousand laborers driven away by oppressive legislation. Homes and employment are waiting for them everywhere. And the proof of this is found in the fact that in all the bloody troubles of which we are told at the South, none, absolutely none, have taken their rise from differences between the laborer and his employer; or if some slight difference has occurred, it has been easily and promptly settled,—as witness the late strikes in a small rice section of South Carolina. All these serious and violent difficulties have been political. No; as long as negro labor is the necessity at the South which it is to-day, so long the negro laborer is armed with weapons of perfect defence. Nowhere will he be in danger until the white employer, maddened by misgovernment, forgets his interest, or in sheer desperation throws to the winds all consideration for his fortunes.

2. We assume that negro suffrage will never be abolished. The negro is a full, free citizen of this Union, and he will remain so. Let us suppose then that, in our county, the abolition of the color line, the restoration of good feeling, and the natural influence of their wealth and intelligence, give the government of the county to the five thousand white men.

Where is the danger to suffrage? Suppose, further, that the first tendency of the change is towards a reactionary policy. It must be admitted that there is a large margin for healthy and wholesome reaction. But how long would it last? As soon as the black votes were freely given to the white minority, how long would that minority hold together in the defiant union into which they have been driven by the banded opposition on the other side? How many candidates for the legislature and county offices would spring up, and what earthly power could prevent them from appealing to the very negro vote which is now their danger? Has political selfishness ever hesitated before any combination that promised success, and how many campaigns would it take to melt Democratic exclusiveness? The abolition of the color line would be the surest protection of negro suffrage.

Extend this picture of the county to the whole South, and you have the condition of the South, and in these considerations the argument for Mr. Lamar's solution.

It is not without its difficulties; but they are difficulties which honest and wise effort on the part of the South can remove. There are some things which the Southern people *must* learn. They must learn that a great failure has some bitter consequences, which time only can cure. They must learn that, in this stage of the world's history, there is a great and conscientious public opinion, which can sympathize with heroic defeat, but will only do so when that defeat brings its proper lesson of chastened wisdom. They must learn that the honest millions of this Union, who have no aspirations for political power or place, but who believe that they have very solemn duties as citizens of a free commonwealth, are determined, not that the white man shall be subordinated and subjected to his former slave, but that the negro shall have a fair field and ample encouragement to develop whatever is best in the nature God has given him. They must learn that the American people will not permit their civilization to be disfigured by bloody riots and high-handed violation of the law, however hard be the evils which they have to bear. And they must learn a truth which runs in the undercurrent of all Mr. Lamar's speech, that their safety lies in no servile adhesion to any party, be it Democratic

or Republican, but in their own wisdom, resolution, and patience. Mr. Lamar has become their pioneer on the right road ; and if there are men enough at the South, especially among the younger generation, who will follow him with equal ability and patriotism, it will not take very long to cut a broad way through the tangle in which we are embarrassed.

In the interest of the whole country, this question must be settled. It has become an issue of national life or death. Either this Union must be preserved as the North fought to maintain it, with its unequalled balance of national power and local self-government, with its widely separated interests blended into one national policy, its widely variant sentiment fused by the heat of a common patriotism into an enduring and advancing national civilization, or it must be separated by something worse even than violent secession. One half of the nation must be converted into an imperial despotism, corrupted and corrupting by its patronage and power, trampling, with superb and cruel selfishness, upon the rights and liberties of States and individuals ; while the other half is transformed into an abject and servile territory, its resources dried up and perished, its history obliterated, and its free people, of all races and colors, bound in a common "drooping and disconsolate household captivity, without refuge and without redemption."

WILLIAM HENRY TRECOT.

ART. II. — THE WHISKEY RING.

CONGRESSIONAL investigations and the press have made known, though in somewhat disjointed form, the chief features of the late war upon whiskey thieves and their abettors. The present article is mainly an attempt to supply some omissions, correct current errors, and, so far as is now possible, set the story in proper order.

While this movement of Secretary Bristow for the suppression of whiskey frauds was a clearly defined campaign, having a definite beginning, sharp outlines, and a sudden ending, it is yet too early for any one to attempt its full history. Much of